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State-Sponsored Terrorism: Libya's Abuse
of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
I. Introduction
Every day the world is threatened by some new act of terror-
ism.' Governments are constantly held hostage to terrorist acts
designed to achieve a political advantage. The aggressive conflicts of
the 1980s implement measures short of outright warfare to
destabilize politically pluralist societies.' Nations, striving to achieve
recognition in an international arena dominated by a few nations,
may resort to terrorism to attain stronger political leverage. In order
to be viewed as a politically viable entity, some states have imple-
mented terrorism as a major political device. This struggle has led to
state-sponsored terrorism through which states have begun to facili-
tate terrorist operations through diplomatic structures.
Libya best illustrates a state's abuse of diplomatic privileges
and 'immunities in support of terrorism. Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi,
Libya's leader, employs terrorism as a substitute for traditional war-
fare.3 The murder of a British police officer in April of 1984 high-
I. Libyan Sponsored Terorrism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, Feb. 19, 1986: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1986) [herein-
after Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers] (statement of Robert B.
Oakley, Director of the Office for Counter Terrorism and Emergency Planning, U.S. Dept. of
State). Initially terrorism is to be distinguished from war in that terrorism violates interna-
tional law, set forth in Hague Convention IV of 1907, requiring belligerent forces to identify
themselves, carry arms openly, and observe the laws of war. Terry, An Appraisal of Lawful
Military Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism, NAVAL WAR C. REV. 59, 61 (1986). Ter-
rorism further diverges from armed conflict because terrorists, motivated by political desires,
typically attack innocent persons and civilians. International Terrorism, Insurgency, and Drug
Trafficking: Present Trends in Terrorist Activity: Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
and Comm. on the Judiciary, (S. Hrg. 99-372), 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 331 (1985) [hereinafter
International Terrorism] (prepared statement of John F. Murphy, Professor of International
Law at Villanova University and Chairman, American Bar Association Interbar Study Group
on International Terrorism).
Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or
group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such
action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a
target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that
group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.
A. WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM 16 (1982).
2. Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, State-
Sponsored Terrorism, S. Rep. No. 56, 99th Cong. Ist Sess. 1-2 (1985) [hereinafter Senate
Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism].
3. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 6(statement of Dr. Yonah Alexander, Member of the Senior Research Staff for the Center for
Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University).
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lights the depth of Libya's diplomatic abuses. Terrorists, harbored in
the Libyan diplomatic establishment in the United Kingdom, shot a
police officer.' The British government permitted these terrorists,
masquerading as diplomats, to escape punishment. The Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations8 was construed as a protectional
shield for the Libyan nationals operating within the diplomatic
establishment.
International law should not hamper governments threatened by
terrorists abusing diplomatic privileges. The ramifications of Libya's
state-supported terrorist network, operating through diplomatic
channels, will be addressed in this Comment." The Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations will be evaluated in light of the April
1984 Libyan embassy shooting. Present international inactivity will
illustrate the legal and political dilemmas faced by a nation's policy
makers in suppressing terrorism. Finally, the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations will be discussed to assess the Convention's vi-
ability in the current political arena threatened by terrorists.
II. The Libyan People's Bureau in the United Kingdom
A. The 1984 Libyan Embassy Incident
On April 17, 1984, a demonstration, prompted by the hanging
of two Tripoli students sentenced to death for treason, formed across
the street from the Libyan People's Bureau.7 The demonstrators con-
sisted of approximately seventy anti-Qaddafi protestors and a group
of Qaddafi supporters.' Many of the anti-Qaddafi demonstrators
wore stocking caps to conceal their identity for fear of retaliation by
the Libyan government.' The protestors made no hostile attacks
upon the Bureau. The British police had no difficulty controlling the
4. Goldberg, The Shoot-out at the Libyan Self-Styled People's Bureau: A Case of
State-Supported International Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1-7 (1984); see also UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI: A PATTERN OF
AGGRESSION, SPECIAL REPORT No. 138, I, 6 (Jan. 1986) [hereinafter LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI:
A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION].
5. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 14, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
6. The activity addressed in this Comment is categorized as covert terrorist behavior or
surrogate terrorism. Three categories have been established to classify terrorist activity. Terror
as coercive diplomacy aims to force compliance with political demands through overt behavior.
Covert terrorist behavior operates as a clandestine service for a nation-state. Surrogate terror-
ism is the assistance given to another state or insurgent terrorist group, heightening the organi-
zation's terroristic capabilities. H. STOHL THE STATE AS TERRORIST 44 (1984).
7. See Nordheimer, Gunmen in London in Libyan Embassy Fires Into Crowd, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 6; see also British Break Off Relations Over London Seige,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at AI, col. I. In 1980, revolutionary committees took over the
Libyan embassy in London as well as in other Western countries and renamed each as the
Libyan People's Bureau. Comment, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Re-
cent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT. L. 641, 643 (1985).




two separate groups; however, gunfire from within the embassy
quickly dispersed the demonstrators. 10 The gunfire killed British Po-
lice Constable Yvonne Fletcher and wounded eleven demonstration
participants."
The shoot-out began an eleven day seige of the Libyan People's
Bureau.12 For five days, negotiators suggested that the embassy oc-
cupants allow police to search the premises. 3 Due to the failure of
peaceful negotiations, the British government severed diplomatic re-
lations with Libya on April 22, 1984.14 The embassy occupants were
given seven days in which to leave the United Kingdom and were
guaranteed safe passage from the country. 5
At the end of the seige, thirty men filed out of the Libyan Peo-
ple's Bureau. 6 The expelled Libyan nationals returned home to a
hearty welcome on April 27.'" Libya's Foreign Minister greeted his
expelled countrymen with the following statement: "We are meeting
our people who have been victims of harrassment for the past ten
days."' 8 Colonel Qaddafi claimed the United Kingdom was to blame
for the British police officer's death and the eleven wounded
demonstrators. '9
B. United Kingdom's Response
Throughout the seige, the British government forbade the police
from entering the People's Bureau because the government believed
the premises and those inside were protected under the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations.2 0 The British government stated
Article 19 of the Convention2 1 protected the embassy because noth-
10. Id.
11. Nordheimer, supra note 7.
12. Apple, Libyans Leave Embassy in Britain and Fly Home, Ending Seige, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
13. FIRST REPORT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS H.C.
PAPER 127 (1984), reprinted in 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 610-20 (1985) [hereinafter FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMM. REPORT].
14. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
15. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM. REPORT, supra note 13; Goldberg, supra note 4, at I.
16. Nineteen of the thirty men who were in the embassy had diplomatic immunity. Ap-
ple, The London Embassy Seige: Unheeded Warnings?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1984, at A6, col.
4.
17. Libyans Receive a Vociferous Welcome Home, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at A3,
col. 1.
18. Id.
19. Smith, supra note 8, at 86. Qaddafi believed the British government had not honored
Article 22 of the Convention, which states that the receiving State must protect the mission
premises. Libyans Surprised by Britain's Move, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984 at A10, col. 1.
20. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at A10, col. I (statement of Mr. Leon Brittain, British
Home Secretary). Libya has acceded to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The
only reservation filed with Libya's accession relates to returning diplomatic baggage suspected
of violating Article 27, section 4. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
as of 31 December 1982, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/2, at 5 (1983).
21. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 19.
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ing indicated that the Bureau, as a foreign mission, was being used
for an improper purpose. 22
The United Kingdom's justification contravenes the essence of
diplomatic facilities and personnel set forth in the Convention be-
cause gunfire into a peaceful crowd is not a proper diplomatic func-
tion. 3 The British Foreign Office Minister, Richard Luce, called the
incident an "unacceptable breach of British law, international law,
and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations."'2 George
Robertson, the Labor Member of Parliament and the Deputy
Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, felt that the use of British streets as
a stage for Libyan domestic affairs abridged the privilege of diplo-
matic immunity.2 5 Robertson further declared that terrorism, offi-
cially sanctioned by the government of the embassy occupants, ne-
cessitates a re-examination of diplomatic relations with Libya.2 6
III. Historical Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel
A. Diplomats in International Relations
Diplomatic immunity is the freedom from local jurisdiction ac-
corded under international law by receiving states to duly accredited
representatives of another state.27 The concept of diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities has existed throughout the history of interna-
tional relations.28 Historically, the exchange of diplomatic proxies
can be separated into two distinct periods.
Initially, ambassadors were granted complete immunity from lo-
cal jurisdiction.2 9 The early practice of diplomatic representatives
developed under the Greek City-States, the Roman states, the Asian
states, and the Islamic countries of West Asia.30 These ancient gov-
ernments sent proxies to represent the nation on a nonpermanent, ad
hoc basis, and the envoys were extended complete personal inviola-
bility while in the receiving state.
The establishment of permanent diplomatic missions evolved
into the modern body of diplomatic privileges and immunities, begin-
ning at the close of the Middle Ages. 31 Since Venice was the diplo-
22. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 611.
23. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 3.
24. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at Al, col. I.
25. Nordheimer, supra note 7.
26. Id.
27. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIP-
LOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, at 12 (Comm. Print. 1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT].
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id.
30. B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 3-4
(1965).
31. Young, The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations, 40 BRIT. Y.B. OF
INT'L LAW 147 (1964).
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matic center during the Renaissance, the Italian cities began to in-
teract more frequently and, therefore, the maintenance of permanent
diplomatic missions became advantageous. The custom of establish-
ing permanent diplomatic legations spread from Italy to other Euro-
pean cities. As commerce and trade spread from Europe to other
nations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the need for dip-
lomatic missions on the trading continents arose.3 2 The interaction of
foreign nations through state envoys gave rise to the current system,
which embodies the customary practices established by these early
nations.33
Although a well-recognized international rule, the law of diplo-
matic privileges and immunities remained entirely customary3 until
the late nineteenth century. 5 Treaties on diplomatic relations dealt
primarily with the treatment of ambassadors on a particular mission
and did not address any long-range, comprehensive guidelines.36 In
1924, the League of Nations recognized that diplomatic privileges
and immunities required international regulation or codification;
however, no comprehensive resolution was adopted by the League of
Nations.37
In 1961, the United Nations codified customary international
law regarding the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents in
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.3 The Convention
formulates a plan by which nations tailor their treatment of diplo-
mats.39 In order to promote international peace and security, the
Convention's ideal is the facilitation of harmonious interaction be-
tween politically intertwined nation-states.40 Since the Vienna Con-
vention is universally accepted as a codification of binding customary
law on diplomatic relations, nonsignatory nations would be extended
32. B. SEN, supra note 30, at 7.
33. Id.
34. See generally B. SEN, supra note 30.
35. Young, supra note 31.
36. Id. at 157.
37. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 27, at 14.
38. Valdez, Privileges and Immunities Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations and the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 15 INT'L LAW 411-19 (1981).
39. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5. The Vienna Convention
is the authoritative statement of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Kerkey, Some Aspects
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 88
(1962).
40. The Preamble states in part as follows:
Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions concerning the sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations,
believing that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse, privileges
and immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among
nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, ...
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, Preamble.
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the same privileges and immunities as signatory states.4
B. Justifications for Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
Historically, three theories have supported the continuation of
immunities granted to diplomats: personal representation, exterritori-
ality, and functional necessity. The personal representation theory
viewed the diplomatic agent as a personification of the sovereign
state he represented.4 2 Consequently, since the sovereign's represen-
tative was the equivalent of the ruler in the receiving state, the invio-
lability of the sending nation extended to the appointed envoy.43 In-
ternational law, however, no longer justifies diplomatic immunity
upon the personal representation theory for several reasons.44 First,
the theory placed the diplomat beyond the receiving state's law, giv-
ing the representative unlimited power.45 Second, due to the increase
of modern democratic nations, the theory was inadequate to deter-
mine the extent of immunities to be granted. 46 Last, the personal
representation theory did not encompass a rationale for extending
immunity to the private acts of diplomats in contrast to their official
acts undertaken while performing proper diplomatic functions.4
The exterritoriality theory emerged from the sixteenth century
concept of feudal society.' 8 Exterritoriality is rooted in a legal fiction
whereby a foreign diplomat is perceived as a resident of the sending
state although currently residing in the host state.' 9 The New York
Supreme Court has recognized the exterritoriality theory, stating
that international law "derives support from the legal fiction that an
ambassador is not an inhabitant of the country to which he is ac-
41. Note, The Diplomatic Relations Act: The U.S. Protects Its Own, 5 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 379, 384 (1979); see also F. DENZA. DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VI-
ENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 135 (1976).
42. R. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES I (1967). The personal repre-
sentation theory enjoyed its greatest popularity as a legal rationale during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Comment, Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction: Essential
to Effective International Relations, 7 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 113-38 (1984).
43. See-Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). The Defendant was
the duly appointed, acting, and accredited Minister of the Republic of France to the Republic
of Bolivia. The diplomat was enroute from France to his post in Bolivia when he was detained.
Id. at 338.
44. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 4.
45. Note, Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189,
198 (1972).
46. In the modern, democratic nation-state, authority is vested in the people and this
authority is distributed among three government branches. Under the personal representation
theory, the governmental entity the ambassador represents would be ambiguous in the modern
democratic system. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at I.
47. Id. at 20.
48. "The terms 'exterritoriality' and 'extraterritoriality' have traditionally been used in-
terchangeably when referring to this theory of diplomatic immunity." Id. at 5, n. 24. While
the modern trend favors the shorter version, both terms are still present in current legal analy-
sis. Id..
49. Id. at 7.
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credited but of the country of his origin, and whose sovereign he
represents, and within whose territory he, in contemplation of law,
always abides."' 50 Since the host state lacks personal jurisdiction over
the diplomat,5 1 jurists enumerated several reasons for disregarding
the theory as an international legal premise.
Exterritoriality described the entire gamut of privileges and im-
munities afforded to diplomats and defined the diplomatic mission as
foreign territory. 52 Due to this broad usage, difficulty arose in detail-
ing the actual immunities that were to be properly extended to diplo-
mats. The exterritoriality theory presupposes an unlimited grant of
authority because the theory fails to establish the proper duties that
a diplomat may engage in for the sending state.5 3 Exterritoriality
also disregards the interdependence of nation-states by an unlimited
immunization from local authority."' In the absence of boundaries
defining the full scope of diplomatic privileges and immunities, the
exterritoriality theory was replaced as the international legal founda-
tion for diplomatic benefits by the functional necessity theory.
Immunities are granted upon the traditional concept that diplo-
mats require immunities to conduct effectively the affairs of the
sending state.55 The functional necessity theory extends privileges
and immunities so that diplomats can function uninhibited by local
authorities. The functional necessity theory shifts the emphasis from
the centralized figure of the diplomat found under both the personal
representation and exterritoriality theories to the functions appropri-
ately served by the foreign proxy.5
The function of the diplomat is the core concern of the func-
tional necessity theory. This is a more realistic approach to deter-
mine the extent of privileges to be bestowed upon diplomatic agents.
Although more pragmatic, the functional necessity theory is not
without criticism.57 For instance, this theory is criticized as too
vague since it does not provide any explanation of those functions
undertaken by the diplomat, necessary to safeguard the sending
state's interests.58 The functional necessity theory has also been de-
nounced for presupposing that diplomats, by requiring immunity to
function properly, engage in illegal or injurious activity. 9
50. Wilson v. Blanco, 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582, 4 N.Y.S. 714 (1889).
51. Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development
Under International Law and Application in United States Practice, 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173,
175 (1960).
52. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 12.
53. P. OGDON, JUDICIAL BASIS OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 102-03 (1936).
54. C. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 49 (1971).
55. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 17.
56. Comment, supra note 42, at 118.
57. See id.
58. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 22.
59. Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Relations Act
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C. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations60 was drafted
utilizing the functional necessity theory as its justification for diplo-
matic privileges and immunities.6 The International Law Commis-
sion formulated the Convention in an attempt to standardize the
treatment of diplomats.62 The treaty recognizes "that the purpose of
such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to
ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic mis-
sions as representing States. 6
3
Diplomats serve as the communications network between na-
tions and they should be protected from a local government's hostile
attempts to abridge the duties the diplomats were appointed to per-
form. As the embodiment of customary international law regarding
diplomatic privileges and immunities, the Convention continues the
traditional practice of full immunity for criminal acts. The Conven-
tion, however, departs from the customary practice of complete civil
immunity by placing limitations on the diplomatic agent's private
activities.6"
Under the Convention, before an agent can be recognized as an
official member of any diplomatic mission, the receiving state must
review a diplomat's accreditation from the sending state.6 5 The ap-
pointing government has a duty to notify the host state of an em-
bassy appointment.6 Under Article 4, the sponsor state must receive
of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (1980).
60. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5.
61. C. MICHAELS, supra note 54.
62. International Law Commission Report, U.N. Con. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Sess., Supp.
No. 9, at 16-17 (A/3859) (1958), reprinted in 53 AM J. INT'L LAW 230, 266 (1959).
63. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, Preamble. The Conven-
tion still maintains an underlying reference to the personal representation theory, but most
likely because the diplomatic agent is a representative appointed by the sovereign. However,
the Convention does not operate under the personal representation theory as the legal justifica-
tion for diplomatic privileges and immunities.
64. The three limitations on the diplomat's immunity for private activities are: I) actions
relating to a diplomat's private immovable property in the local jurisdiction, 2) actions in
which the diplomatic agent is involved as an executor, administrator, or heir in a private ca-
pacity, and 3) actions relating to commercial or professional activity undertaken by the diplo-
mat outside of the functions for the sending state. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
supra note 5, art. 31. Private activities are those undertaken by the diplomat in a personal
capacity, to be distinguished from duties performed under the scope of the sending state's
appointment privilege.
65. See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 1-7.
66. Article 10 of the Convention provides in part as follows:
I. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, or such other ministry
as may be agreed upon, shall be notified of:
(a) the appointment of members of the mission, their arrival and their
final departure or the termination of their functions with the mission; ...
(d) the engagement and discharge of persons resident in the receiving
State as members of the mission or private servants entitled to privileges
and immunities.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 10, para. I.
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the host state's agreement that the nominated head of a mission is
satisfactory to the host state.17 Moreover, the receiving state is under
no obligation to accept an envoy and is not required to state reasons
for rejecting a diplomatic nominee. 8 Furthermore, Article 11 em-
powers the receiving state to refuse acceptance of an entire category
of officials.69
Once the host nation accredits a diplomat, the Convention,
through a classification of diplomatic personnel, restricts the scope of
available immunities on the basis of the functions performed by the
diplomatic mission members.7 0 Article 37 categorizes the diplomatic
personnel into four groups: the diplomat and his or her family, the
administrative and technical staff, the mission's service staff, and the
private servants of the diplomat.71 Diplomats and their immediate
families are accorded the traditional spectrum of immunities.72 The
administrative and technical staff, including their families, are ex-
tended full criminal immunity, with civil immunities limited to acts
performed within the scope of their duties.73 The service staff is only
permitted immunity for those acts undertaken during the course of
their official duties.74 Private servants no longer enjoy any level of
diplomatic immunity unless it is specifically granted by the receiving
state.
75
The personal inviolability of the diplomat has been viewed as
the basic principle from which all privileges and immunities have
been derived.76 Diplomats and their families, as well as the adminis-
trative and technical staff, are immune from any form of arrest or
detention. 77 An exception to complete immunity from arrest or de-
tention arises in circumstances in which the receiving state detains a
diplomatic agent in order to prevent the commission of a particular
crime. 78 Another exception to the doctrine arises when the sending
67. Article 4(l) provides as follows: "The sending State must make certain that the
agreement of the receiving State has been given for the person it proposes to accredit as head
of the mission to that State." (Emphasis added.) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
supra note 5. art. 4, para. I.
68. Article 4(2) provides as follows: "The receiving State is not obliged to give reasons
to the sending State for a refusal of agreement." (Emphasis added.) Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 4, para. 2.
69. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. II, para. 2.
70. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 37.
71. Id.
72. Id. para. I.
73. Id. para. 2.
74. Id. para. 3.
75. Id. para. 4.
76. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 46.
77. The Convention provides as follows: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be invi-
olable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat
him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person,
freedom or dignity." Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 29.
78. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran
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state waives the diplomatic protection. 79 The waiver is permissible by
the state because immunity for diplomatic agents is a privilege
granted to the state and not to the individual. 80 However, the sover-
eign rarely waives immunity.81
D. Proper Diplomatic Functions
The diplomatic personnel serve a variety of functions for their
respective nations. The diplomatic mission exists to represent the
sending state in the host state, to protect the interests of the sending
state within the limits of international law, to act as a negotiator
between the receiving and sending nations, to ascertain by all lawful
means developments in the host state, and to promote friendly rela-
tions between the sending and receiving nations.82 The Convention's
enumeration of duties is consistent with the functional necessity the-
ory 83 in that it provides a-field of activity within which the diplomat
must operate. A diplomatic agent should be protected from a local
authority's coercive measures if the agent faithfully discharges his
duties and abides by local laws.84
Under international law, this jurisdictional shield afforded to
diplomats does not confer a license to disregard local law.8 5 More-
over, this shield of immunity protects diplomatic agents from conse-
quences of acts that, if perpetrated by someone subject to local law,
would incur severe penalties. 86 The Convention frames proper diplo-
matic functions by which those granted privileges should tailor their
activities to receive the full benefit of immunities under the Conven-
tion. Arguably, any privileges and immunities afforded to diplomatic
agents should only be extended when pursuing proper diplomatic
functions. 87
The Convention stresses that the need for diplomatic activity
stay within the bounds of the proper diplomatic functions set forth in
Article 3.88 Diplomats are required to abide by local laws although a
violation does not negate the personal immunities granted to the
v. U.S.), 1980 I.C.J. 40 (Judgement of May 24, contra). The New York Court of Appeals
held that diplomatic ministers are universally immune from bodily restraint. See Bergman v.
De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
79. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 32.
80. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5; see also Dickinson v. Del
Solar, [1930] I K.B. 376, 380.
81. See Comment, supra note 42, at 134.
82. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 3.
83. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
84. Green, Trends in the Law Concerning Diplomats, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 132, 135
(1981).
85. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 27.
86. Id. at 29 (statement of Senator Sarbanes).
87. Green, supra note 84, at 133.
88. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 41.
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agent under Article 29.89 Historically, the observance of local laws
was treated as a corollary to the receiving state's duty to extend priv-
ileges and immunities.9" One writer viewed this duty upon the diplo-
mat as a moral obligation to respect the receiving state's laws.9 Un-
less a specific exemption exists as a matter of policy or an
international rule must be upheld, the modern practice specifies that
the diplomat be subject to the substance of local law with regard to
his private acts.92
The Convention, which is the international standard on diplo-
matic privileges, excuses criminal acts committed by a diplomat.9 3
The complete criminal immunity illustrates the extensive privileges
granted to diplomats. The immunity is based on jurisdiction, not lia-
bility, because the act must be regarded as an act of the sending
state.9 " Attributing the violation to the sending state maintains the
functional premise of the Convention; however, acts perpetrated on
behalf of the state only legitimize any unlawful conduct. Even if le-
gal liability is placed upon the sending state, no legal punishment
will result because the nation is protected under the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.95
E. Mechanism to Curb Diplomatic Abuse
The Convention acknowledges the potential abuse of diplomatic
privileges and immunities by providing the receiving state with a
mechanism to handle a diplomat's abuse. 9 The Convention permits
the host state to declare a diplomat persona non grata.97 The per-
sona non grata label provides the receiving state with a protective
means to avoid further sufferance from an unacceptable diplomat.98
When the host state requests the sending state to recall the offensive
agent, no reasons need to be enunciated. 99 Therefore, the persona
non grata status may be declared prior to the diplomat's entry into
the receiving state.' This buttresses the requirement of prior con-
sent by the host state before accepting the envoy.
89. Id.
90. F. DENZA, supra note 41, at 263-64.
91. The duty to respect the receiving state's laws has been viewed as a moral obligation
that is less than the imposition of a legal duty. Id.
92. However, this ignores the function premise of the Convention, which grants complete
criminal immunity. Id. at 264.
93. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 37.
94. F. DENZA, supra note 94, at 264.
95. Id.
96. Green, supra note 84, at 137.
97. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 9, para. 1. In inter-
national law, a person not acceptable to the court or government to which he was appointed is
labelled persona non grata. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (5th ed. 1979).
98. F. DENZA, supra note 41, at 40.
99. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 9, para. 2.
100. F. DENZA, supra note 41, at 43.
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However, in the current political atmosphere, practical applica-
tion of the Convention does not provide adequate redress for abuses
of diplomatic privileges and immunities committed in the receiving
state. The Convention merely establishes the avenue by which the
receiving state may prevent recurrent abuses by an individual diplo-
mat. The Convention embodies no general security mechanism to
punish abuses of the diplomatic infrastructure.
IV. State-Sponsored Terrorism: The Libyan Example
A. Terrorism as a State Tool
A number of totalitarian governments actively export terror-
ism. 01 State-sponsored terrorism can be defined as follows:
The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of
violence by sovereign.states (or sub-national groups encouraged
or assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political
objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create over-
whelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or
military victims attacked or threatened.02
Recent history further supports that "[t]he main goal of this state-
sponsored terrorism now at the end of the twentieth century is to
undermine selectively the policies, the psycho-social stability, and po-
litical governability of pluralist states with representative
governments."'' 03
State-sponsored terrorism is commonly called low-intensity con-
flict because it serves as intentional yet undeclared warfare. 0 4 Ter-
rorism, sponsored by a government, targets foreign institutions that
might not be effectively destroyed by direct confrontation. 05 For ex-
ample, a country's political stability, commercial activity, and diplo-
matic relations are undermined by terrorism. 00 Terrorism attempts
to thwart the harmonious interaction of nations. Further, state-sup-
ported terrorism undermines respect for international law and peace-
101. "At present, Communist states, especially the Soviet Union, and a number of other
militant totalitarian regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, are exporting terrorists and terror
techniques into other countries whose governments they wish to injure or overthrow." Senate
Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at Xl.
102. Id. at XIII.
103. Id.
104. Id. The United States Army defines low-intensity conflict (LIC) as follows: "A
broad term describing political-military struggle, short of conventional warfare between na-
tional armed forces, to achieve poliical, social, economic, or psychological objectives. The mili-
tary aspects of LIC are characterized by constraints on the level of violence, weaponry and
tactics." The aim of LIC is to create social discontent. War lies at the opposite end of the
spectrum because war utilizes overt, organized military hostilities. Senate Subcommittee Re-
port on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 49-51.




ful resolutions of conflicts.
Organized international terrorism is a principal instrument em-
ployed by totalitarian nations to destroy democracy. 10 7 The most sig-
nificant factor in the growth of terrorism is state sponsorship, which
implements terrorism as a coercive foreign policy tool. 108 Interna-
tional terrorism has an escalation potential, although the terroristic
act itself has a relatively low strategic value.1 9 However, this low
value potential accredited to a singular terroristic event may not ac-
curately reflect the problem because terrorist activity frequently re-
sults in concessions from the attacked nation. For example, the 1979
Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) attack on the Egyptian
embassy in Ankara, Turkey resulted in an official recognition of the
P.L.O. by Turkey such that the organization was permitted to open
a diplomatic office in the country. 10 Similar concessions, springing
from one terroristic event, provide the foundation for terrorism legit-
imacy and increased terrorist activity.
Once a terrorist group has state-sponsorship, intelligence, diplo-
matic, and political contacts become available to facilitate terrorist
missions. "' Terrorist factions reach a level of dependency upon state
support, developing into surrogate bodies of the state." 2 Most major
terrorist groups have maintained a direct or indirect support line
with the state." 3 State sponsorship is a critical factor in terrorism
maintenance."' Sustained terrorism requires state support as a ma-
jor financial source." 5 Terrorism would be less of a problem if the
various state systems facilitating political violence were denied the
ability to assist terrorist activity."6 The highly destructive nature of
107. M. ASA. ON TERRORISM AND COMBATING TERRORISM 119 (A. Merari ed. 1985).
108. Id. at 121.
109. International terrorism is to be distinguished from "narco-terrorism" and "Euro-
terrorism." "Narco-terrorism" describes a political terrorist group operating in narcotics to
raise the financial support for terrorist missions. "Euro-terrorism" categorizes the integration
and coordination of European terrorist activity. Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for
Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 4-6 (statement of Fred C. Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, U.S. Dep't of Defense).
110. International Terrorism. supra note I, at 75 (statement of Martin Sicker, Director,
Center for International Security, Washington, D.C.).
I 1. State sponsorship involves the direct or indirect association of the state with a ter-
roristic entity for purposes of coercion and widespread intimidation to achieve a political or
strategic objective. This can be achieved by directing the terrorists activities, supplying mone-
tary support and weapons, and providing training and intelligence functions. Senate Subcom-
mittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 58-61.
112. Once a level of dependency upon the state is reached, the nation can direct the
activities of the terrorist group. For example, Libya and Syria played a role in the P.L.O
power struggle of 1982 by supporting factions challenging Chairman Yassar Arafat's leader-
ship. Id. at 62.
113. Id. at 65.
114. M. ASA, supra note 107, at 127.
115. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 5
(statement of Fred C. Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Dept. of Defense).
116. Id.
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international terrorism in the 1980s is due to the infrastructure of
state sponsorship.1 1 7
The Middle East has become the primary source of interna-
tional terrorism, accounting for thirty-five percent of terrorist inci-
dents." 8 The Soviet Union is a major sponsor of international terror-
ism, spending approximately two hundred million dollars annually on
terrorist training programs.119 Almost all Arab countries support
Palestinian terrorists, the more active, radical countries being Libya,
Syria, Algeria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. 120
Libya independently maintains an international terrorism structure
in contrast to the client states of the Soviet Union.2 Client states
undertake terrorist activity to attain the sponsoring state's goals
while independent states promote terrorism as a political tool for
their own aims.
While terrorism is not solely exported from the Middle East,
this region hosts numerous camps to train foreign terrorist organiza-
tions."2 The Palestinian connection flourishes because the groups
have access to the state's infrastructure as an operational resource
and have free maneuverability in several countries. 2 3 Libya has sup-
ported Palestinian terrorist groups, most notably the Abu Nidal
group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - gen-
eral command.12 4 These groups further extend the assistance they
receive to other terrorist organizations, proliferating the worldwide
terrorist network.12 5
B. Libyan Support for Terrorism
Libya, under Colonel Mu'ammer Qaddafi since 1969, has incor-
porated terrorism as a political tool.' 2 6 Terrorist groups have become
surrogate bodies of the Libyan government. Libyan-employed terror-
ism is considered a substitute for traditional warfare.1 27 Qaddafi
aims to reorder Third World politics through subversion of opposi-
tion governments.' 28 The Libyan leader strives to unify the Arab
117. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 65.
118. International Terrorism, supra note I, at 295.
119. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 2
(statement of Fred C. Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Dept. of Defense).
120. M. ASA, supra note 107, at 120.
121. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 1I.
122. Z. GAD. ON TERRORISM AND COMBATING TERRORISM 137 (A. Merari ed. 1985).
123. Id. at 140.
124. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 4
(statement of Robert B. Oakley).
125. Id.





world with a personal expansion of influence and power.1 29 Qaddafi
believes armed struggle is the only means of uniting the Arab
states.130 Libya's state-supported terrorists implement this singular
policy by attacking opponents worldwide.
In order to achieve his unification goal, Qaddafi has supported
various terrorist organizations to create political instability. In 1985,
by giving millions of dollars, training, arms, and travel assistance to
commit attacks abroad, Libya strengthened an alliance with the Abu
Nidal group. This group is officially known as "Al Fatah - the Rev-
olutionary Council."' 1 The Abu Nidal organization, headed by
Sabri al-Banna, was originally a faction of the P.L.O. a2
Abu Nidal separated from the P.L.O. in 1974 because the or-
ganization had become moderate in attempts to liberate Palestine. 33
Abu Nidal focuses aggression upon moderate Palestinian and Arab
leaders who- participate in the Middle East peace process. 34 The
Fatah is committed to the violent destruction of reconciliation efforts
between Israel and Arab states. 30 The organization believes the
combination of Arab revolution with terrorism is necessary to
achieve Palestinian freedom.1 31
The Fatah is one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the
Middle East.' 37 Libya has increased support for Abu Nidal and re-
portedly hosts the group's operational center." The group is well
organized, highly financed, and operates through a tight compart-
mentalization of its targets. As a result, Abu Nidal has become the
most effective, radical Palestinian terrorist organization. 9 The
Fatah consists of several hundred members and uses Palestinian stu-
dents studying abroad to implement terrorist missions."'4 In 1985,
their operations accounted for nearly seventy deaths and two hun-
dred and one wounded. "' The organization does not confine terrorist
missions to its fundamental regional goals. The Fatah has increas-
ingly expanded its operations field into Western Europe.1 2 Cur-
129. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note I, at I.
130. Id.
131. LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI: A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION, supra note 4, at 4.
132. Id.
133. Yassar Arafat banned P.L.O. terrorist actions in regions outside of Israel and occu-
pied territories. Id.
134. Id. at 2.




139. The tight control the Fatah maintains in preparing a terrorist mission makes infil-
tration extremely difficult. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5; see also Appendix.
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rently, Europe is the largest target arena for terrorist acts.1"3
Qaddafi claims the right to murder Libyan dissidents around
the world 14 4 and, as such, he actively promotes terrorism by assassi-
nating dissidents abroad, waving violence as a Libyan policy banner
(see Appendix). 145 In 1980, Qaddafi's extermination scheme mur-
dered eleven Libyan expatriates abroad. 46 In 1985, Qaddafi spon-
sored attacks in Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and West Ger-
many."4 The United States has not gone untouched by Libya's reign
of terror. A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared
persona non grata in May 1985 and non-official Libyans were also
revealed in an attempt to assassinate dissidents in four American
states." 8
Over a four year period, in at least four European cities, the
Qaddafi government has sponsored a series of assassinations of Lib-
yan nationals. 4 9 For example, in March of 1984, both London and
Manchester were the victims of numerous bomb attacks that injured
several dozen Arabs.150 The police believed the bombs were part of
Qaddafi's terror campaign against Libyan exiles.' 5 ' Diplomatic air-
line facilities serve as another link in Qaddafi's chain of terrorist
1152operations.
By appointing known terrorists to the Libyan People's Bureau,
Libyan diplomats have actually carried out terrorist missions.8 3
Therefore, in a country that is a prime Qaddafi target, such as Su-
dan, the resumption of diplomatic ties is exploited by terrorists oper-
ating under diplomatic status.' 54 Additionally, journalists, critical of
Qaddafi's expelling over three thousand Tunisians and confiscating
their property, were sent letter bombs in September of 1985 by Lib-
yan diplomats.155
143. International Terrorism, supra note 1, at 298 (prepared statement of Robert B.
Oakley).
144. Libya's Role in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on African Affairs, and the Subcomm. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of
the Senate Subcomm. on Foreign Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on African Af-
fairs, and the Subcomm. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1981) [hereinafter Libyan Activities] (statement of
Chester Crocker, Asst. Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State).
145. Id.
146. LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI: A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION, supra note 4, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Smith, supra note 8.
150. Nordheimer, supra note 7.
151. Id. The British government expelled four members of the Libyan diplomatic corps
for complicity in the attacks. Four officials of the Libyan People's Bureau were also deported
in 1980 for the politically organized murder of two Libyans. Sutton, Diplomatic Immunity and
the Seige of the Libyan People's Bureau, 1985 PUB. L. 193, 194 (1985).
152. Libyan Activities. supra note 144, at 2.
153. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers. supra note 5, at 5.
154. LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI: A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION, supra note 4, at 2.
155. Id. at 2-3.
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Libyan diplomatic facilities provide support for African terrorist
groups.1 56 In South and Southeast Asia, Qaddafi's diplomatic estab-
lishments host an infrastructure for subversion tactics, such as finan-
cial disbursement and organized leftist training."" In the summer of
1984, Libya lost its Grenada embassy and has been forced to use
other diplomatic posts in the region as operational bases. 0
Qaddafi hosts numerous training sites for foreign terrorist orga-
nizations. A current statistic lists forty-four training sites that in-
struct terrorists in tactics, explosives, kidnapping, hijacking, assassi-
nation, and the use of small arms.1 59 In order to support these
training sites, Qaddafi imported five billion dollars in arms from
1974 to 1978.160
In addition to tactical training, Libya provides a support net-
work for terrorist activities through numerous abuses of diplomatic
privileges and immunities. The Libyan diplomatic corps provides ex-
tensive and diverse support for terrorism.161 Libyan embassies serve
as communication centers for Qaddafi-sponsored terrorist missions
abroad.62 Foreign diplomatic establishments store and distribute the
weapons or explosives used to assassinate expatriate Libyans. 1'3 Dip-
lomatic missions, representing Libya, have been reported by Libyan
exiles in London as arsenals for a terror campaign against them.
16 4
C. Terrorists as Diplomatic Agents
Protection of Libyan terrorists under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations ignores the fundamental principles of the Con-
vention. As one author has stated, "[tihe purpose of the Vienna Con-
vention is to grant immunity only to bona fide diplomatic agents, to
bona fide embassies and to bona fide diplomatic bases, but not to
terrorists masquerading as diplomats."' 65 Qaddafi has repeatedly
demonstrated widespread abuse of diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties by employing diplomatic facilities as terrorist operational ba-
ses."6  Through such conduct, the Libyan leader continually disre-
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 10-
13.
160. In 1978, Qaddafi spent $1.9 million on weapons. Libyan Activities, supra note 144,
at 2.
161. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 7.
162. Id. at 8.
163. LIBYA UNDER QADDAFI: A PATTERN OF AGGRESSION, supra note 4, at 6.
164. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at AI, col. I.
165. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 2.
166. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note I, at 14.
Libya's diplomatic structure has been used on numerous occasions to assist terroristic missions.
Libya has provided arms through diplomatic couriers for terrorists. For example, the P.L.O.
received the weapons used against the Saudi Embassy in Sudan via Libya's diplomatic pouch.
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gards the boundaries of recognized international law.1 1 7
D. The Libyan Embassy in the United Kingdom
Under Qaddafi's approval, the Libyan People's Bureau in the
United Kingdom was seized by revolutionary students on February
18, 1984.1" The British government had been notified of Ambassa-
dor Kuwiri's removal as the Libyan representative in charge of the
embassy.' e9 However, the British government was not informed of a
successor to Ambassador Kuwiri. 1 0 Moreover, the government was
not notified of any internal appointments within the embassy or
given the names of the current inhabitants in the Libyan People's
Bureau. 71 The British Foreign Office had accepted and accredited a
Charge d'Affaires, which is permitted under the Convention.17 2
The traditional procedure for an ambassador is acceptance by
the Head of State of the receiving country, and an ambassador must
be accredited in this fashion.173 Although the Foreign Office had ac-
credited a Charge d'Affaires, he performed his function under revo-
lutionary committee directives and this revolutionary committee had
no diplomatic status.174
The embassy gunfire directed against Qaddafi demonstrators in
April of 1984 blatantly violated the functional premise of the Con-
vention.17 5 The Convention bestows upon foreign envoys privileges
and immunities to the extent necessary to pursue proper diplomatic
functions.1 76 The shooting from the Libyan People's Bureau was not
a proper diplomatic mission under the Convention.177 The death of
Switzerland also expelled the Libyan Charge D'Affaires in April 1983 for transferring arms to
local terrorists. Libyan embassies further assist terrorists by providing arms, cash, forged pass-
ports, and counterfeit documents. The Libyan embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, operates
as a contact for Asian and Libyan terrorists. Furthermore, Spain expelled two Libyan diplo-
mats in December 1985 when it was discovered the diplomats were planning an attack. Id. at
8.
167. Libyan Activities, supra note 144, at 6.
168. Smith, supra note 8.
169. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 610.
170. Id.
171. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 7.
172. Id. at 3. A Charges D'affaires is a duly accredited foreign representative accepted
by the minister of foreign affairs in the receiving state. A Charges d'affaires ad interim is not
a duly accredited official, but is the senior official who represents the head of the mission
during any absence. H. JANKOVIC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (1984).
173. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 19, para. 1.
174. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 10.
175. Smith, supra note 8.
176. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 10.
177. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states proper diplo-
matic functions as follows:
I. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in:
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and
of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
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British Police Constable Fletcher, while protecting the Libyan Peo-
ple's Bureau,178 hardly qualifies as a promotion of friendly relations.
Diplomatic agents are to protect the interests of the sending
state through lawful means when the diplomats are in the receiving
state.17 ' The Libyan embassy occupants were protecting only Qad-
dafi's interests by destroying negative sentiments in the host state;
however, the Convention requires that such protection be achieved
by lawful measures. 180 Murder is not a lawful means to accomplish a
diplomatic function. Furthermore, the lawful ascertainment of devel-
opments by the diplomat in the host state is not attained by shooting
innocent demonstrators.
The Convention operates to offer immunity to an embassy and
its duly accredited members who undertake proper diplomatic rela-
tions.181 Article 41, section 3 clearly states that an embassy may not
be used incompatibly with either the functions set forth in Article 3
or any other general rules of the international law. 182 "Harboring hit
squads clearly does not come within the protection of that
provision."' 83
Throughout this scenario, the British government was denied its
rights under the Convention. Prior to the takeover by the revolution-
aries, the United Kingdom had not been given the opportunity to
declare the embassy occupants persona non grata.'" The British
Foreign Office repeatedly attempted to obtain information concern-
ing internal embassy appointments and received no response to these
requests.1 85 In the absence of any formal notification, the Committee
of Revolutionary Students enjoyed no diplomatic status. 8 The em-
bassy occupants never received diplomatic acceptance; therefore,
they were not bona fide diplomats entitled to protection under the
Convention. 187
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the
receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending
State;
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiv-
ing State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 3, para, 1.
178. Libya formally renamed its embassies as the Libyan People's Bureau.
179. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 3.
180. Id.
181. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 9.
182. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 41, para. 3.
183. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 10.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. at 7.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 3.
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V. Terrorists Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations
A. Protection of Internal Security
International diplomacy serves to balance the pursuit of foreign
policy interests with the respect for the territorial integrity of the
receiving state.188 Diplomats are granted privileges and immunities
on a reciprocal basis because this exchange facilitates relations
among nations. Diplomatic relations survive due to reciprocal obliga-
tions upheld by all nations.189 A state's own agents are in a sense
hostage in the receiving state and their privileges are dependent upon
the foreign state's treatment of diplomats. 1' 0 The balancing of inter-
ests through diplomatic discourse can only be achieved when diplo-
mats do not flout local laws.191 However, violations of local law do
not annul a diplomatic agent's personal privileges and immunities.1 92
The Vienna Convention was drafted prior to the implementation
of terrorism as a strategic political device. 193 The receiving state's
security takes precedence over a diplomat's immunity. 19' Exceptions
arise to personal inviolability when the diplomat disturbs the receiv-
ing state's internal stability or when an agent conspires against the
nation." ' This doctrine is best set forth in a 1947 Canadian case,
Rose v. The King, in which the court concluded as follows:
Before granting or recognizing a privilege to another State, a
State has the right to accord to itself a first privilege, that of its
own security. To decide otherwise would be to grant a so-called
international rule of authority superior to the strict, rigid, and
necessary rule that the State, first and foremost, owes a duty to
its citizens . . . of its own security. . . . The first duty of the
diplomatic agent is to respect the security of the State.198
Temporary detention, in order to prevent a threat to a state's inter-
nal security, is an exception to complete personal inviolability.197
The British police made no arrests after the Libyan's gunfire
injured demonstrators." 89 However, diplomatic agents can be ar-
rested, and then they must plead immunity as a defense to prosecu-
188. Comment, supra note 7, at 645.
189. Id.
190. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AcT, supra note 27, at 15.
191. Id.
192. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 5, art. 29.
193. Sutton, supra note 151, at 201.
194. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 83.
195. Id.
196. Rose v. King, 2 Ex. C.R. 107 (1947).
197. R. WILSON, supra note 42, at 85.
198. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 10.
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tion. 99 Similarly, terrorists masquerading as diplomats should not be
afforded protection under the Convention that they have systemati-
cally abused. Terrorism, assisted by a nation's diplomatic establish-
ments, is not a situation contemplated by the Convention. Therefore,
a nation whose internal security is threatened by diplomats should
not be confined by the Convention in countering terrorism.
A nation attacked by a diplomat operating as a state-sponsored
terrorist has no legal recourse to punish the sponsoring state. The
mere expulsion of the diplomat only satisfies the current situation;
however, a nation has no punitive measure to deter future diplomatic
abuse. The diplomatic agent typically returns to the sending state as
a glorified soldier fighting for his state's political superiority. 00
State-sponsored terrorism should not permit an interpretation of the
Convention such that the Convention becomes a suicide pact for civi-
lized countries. 201
B. Global Response
"If terrorism is tolerated, it may become a mode of operation by
governments as a form of covert or surrogate warfare. '20 2 The diffi-
culty, however, may not be one of toleration, but rather a lack of
effective measures by governments to legally restrain terrorists and
concurrently prevent international discord. Government inaction
stems from a variety of policy considerations: concern for the safety
of nationals abroad, the uncertainty of whether economic sanctions
are effective, and other foreign policy interests.210
Governments seek to protect numerous foreign policy interests,
which include the protection of nationals living abroad, the exchange
of technological advancement, and the sale of commodities between
199. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978). In this case, the defend-
ants, Valdik Aleksandrovich Enger and Rudolf Petrovick Chernyayev, citizens of the Union of
the Soviet Socialist Republic, were charged with various espionage offenses. Both Defendants
were denied immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, codified in 22
U.S.C. § 254 et. seq. because they did not have diplomatic status nor were they "an intimate
associate with the work of the permanent diplomatic mission." Id. at 506. United States v.
Egoro, 222 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). In this case, the defendants, Ivan Dmitrievich
Egorov and his wife, Aleksandia Egorov, were issued diplimatic passports by their country;
however, this does not control the determination of diplomatic status nor does the title con-
ferred upon him by the host nation. Id. at 107. To deny the United States the right to accredit
him as a diplomat would deny the United States its sovereign right to pass upon the accepta-
bility to it of diplomatic representatives of foreign governments. Id. at 108.
200. The occupants of the Libyan People's Bureau who were responsible for the death of
the British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher, received a hearty welcome on their return to Libya.
Libya felt that their people had been the victims of harassment after the shooting on April 16,
1984. Libyans Receive Vociferous Welcome Home, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
201. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 2.
202. T. HARKABI, ON TERRORISM AND COMBATING TERRORISM 20 (A. Merari ed.
1985).
203. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 8
(statement by Robert B. Oakley).
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nations. In order to protect these foreign policy interests, long-term,
collective measures are needed to combat political terrorism20 4 and,
more importantly, to curb terrorist proliferation. "State-supported
terrorism . . . has become commonplace in many parts of the
world."20 5 State support for terrorism will increase, 'allowing terrorist
operations to become more effective, more sophisticated, and more
destructive. 06 The balancing of foreign policy interests with respect
for territorial integrity is the goal of international diplomacy.2 07 A
factor that plays a crucial role in tailoring a nation's lawful response
to abuses of diplomatic status by the sending nation is the protection
of nationals residing in the state sponsoring the abusive diplomats.20 8
It is believed the United Kingdom conceded to granting the Lib-
yan People's Bureau immunity in April 1984 to safeguard the eight
thousand British nationals in Libya.2 0 9 A similar consideration pre-
vented West Germany from implementing an effective response to
counter Libyan terrorism. In April 1985, Qaddafi had a Libyan dis-
sident assassinated in West Germany, precipitating the mere recall
of the German Ambassador from Tripoli.210 This meaningless reac-
tion was substantiated by West Germany's fear for one thousand five
hundred West Germans in Libya. 211 The protection of nationals is a
legitimate concern for a state; however, subjecting the local popula-
tion to internal security sacrifices, especially for purely economic
reasons, only promotes continued state-sponsored terrorism.
The United States example weakens the rationale for conces-
sions based upon commercial personnel living abroad. After the
United States severed diplomatic relations with Libya, numerous
Americans have continued to reside in Libya 21 2 The Americans op-
erate commercial enterprises valued by Qaddafi'for technological as-
sistance.21 3 The commercial personnel reside in "Special Interests
Sections" and have gone unmolested by the government. 21 4 Further-
more, private commercial enterprises that continue operations, once
warned of potential danger, should not hold their nations hostage to
terrorism.
204. Id. at 9.
205. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 2
(statement of Dr. Yonah Alexander, Member of the Senior Research Staff for the Center for
Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University).
206. Id. at 3.
207. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 8.
208. Id.
209. Apple, supra note 16.
210. International Terrorism, supra note I, at 2 (statement of the Chairman, Senator
Thurmond).
211. Id.





Weak punishment and inactivity by liberal democracies creates
a low-risk atmosphere in which perpetrators freely engage in terror-
ism on the state's behalf. 1" As a result of global inaction to counter
terrorism, Qaddafi does not fear world reaction because the Libyan
leader continues to violate international law by sponsoring
terrorism.2 16
Governments, other than the United States, have been reluctant
to take positive actions to exert pressure upon Qaddafi. 17 President
Reagan has unilaterally moved to terminate remaining commercial
and financial ties with Libya in response to the 1985 Rome and Vi-
enna airport attacks. 18 In addition to economic sanctions, the
United States has taken legislative steps to prevent terrorists from
escaping punishment. Two bills recently introduced in the United
States Senate would criminalize terrorist acts." 9 The Senate is also
considering a bill authorizing the death penalty for first degree mur-
der committed by a terrorist.22 0 Another Senate bill, currently in the
Committee on the Judiciary, would permit United States prosecution
of terrorists who attack Americans abroad.2
A global approach is necessary to eradicate terrorism 22  and
eliminate further proliferation. To combat terrorism, international
standards need to be formulated to condemn state-supported terror-
ism. 223 An international framework could limit the increasingly fre-
quent use of terroristic measures to gain political leverage. The inter-
national community's failure to label terrorism as criminal behavior
and as low-intensity warfare directly contributes to the growth of
terrorist activity.224 Criminalizing terrorism would eliminate any le-
gitimacy terrorist groups might believe they operate under, thereby
destroying the effect of terrorism.22 5 Furthermore, criminalization of
terrorist acts would justify self-defense under international law. 226
215. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 7.
216. International Terrorism, supra note 1, at 73.
217. Libyan Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policy Makers, supra note 1, at 7
(statement of Robert B. Oakley).
218. Id. at 6-7.
219. Two currently pending bills, the International Terrorism Control Act and the Inter-
national Terrorism Deterrence Act, would create the crime of international terrorism and set
forth appropriate sanctions to constrain individual terrorists and states sponsoring terrorist op-
erations. See S. 1940 and S. 1941, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
220. The Terrorist Death Penalty Act of 1985 was introduced in the Senate on July 26,
1985 to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a). The proposed amendment provides that a terrorist con-
victed of first degree murder can be sentenced to death, but only after consideration of mitigat-
ing and aggravating factors. See S. 1508, 99th Cong., ist Sess. (1985).
221. Terrorist Acts Against United States Nationals Abroad, S. 1429, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1985).
222. M. AsA, supra note 107, at 130.
223. Id. at 125.
224. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 59.
225. T. HARKABI, supra note 202, at 21.
226. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2.
Fall 19861
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:1
International law recognizes that the use of force is permissible
in self-defense. 227 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter legally
permits a nation to use force in self-defense against an armed at-
tack.228 Forceful reprisals directed towards states sponsoring terrorist
activity may fall within the meaning of armed attack under the
United Nations Charter .2 9 However, the fear of escalation from
armed reprisals could be one reason why terrorism remains a non-
criminal activity under international law.
The United States Department of Justice disfavors criminal leg-
islation containing the term terrorism.2 13  The Department believes
basing legislative enactments upon the pivotal determination of polit-
ical motivation in order to prosecute a terrorist could contain a sanc-
tuary note for violence as acceptable human conduct. 3
C. Failure of United Nations to Curb Terrorism
Five multilateral conventions exist addressing specific terrorist
acts.23 2 The existing international conventions, however, can only
serve as a moral force against terrorism because they lack effective
enforcement mechanisms.23 8 There exists no generally accepted defi-
nition of terrorism.2 " Before any type of collective plans can be for-
mulated to counter the proliferation of terrorism, a consensual defi-
227. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada, Reflections on the Lawfulness of the
Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 133 (1984).
228. R. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 265
(1963).
229. The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate set forth a more
realistic interpretation of "armed attack" to describe Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty:
Experience has shown that armed attack is ordinarily self-evident ... it should
be pointed out that the words 'armed attack' clearly do not mean an incident
created by irresponsible groups or individuals, but rather an attack by one State
upon another. Obviously, purely internal disorders or revolutions would not be
considered 'armed attack' with the meaning of Article 5. However, if a revolu-
tion were aided and abetted by an outside power such assistance might possibly
be considered an armed attack.
Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
230. International Terrorism, supra note I, at 412 (prepared responses of the U.S. De-
partment of Defense).
231. Id.
232. See The Convention on Offenses & Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
crafts, done at Tokyo, Sept. 14, 1963 [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704
U.N.T.S. 219; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at
Hague, Dec. 16, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971); The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at
Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971, [19731 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973 [1976-19771 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146,
U.N.Doc. A/9030 (1974); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 23, U.N. Doe. A/34/39 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456
(1979).
233. International Terrorism, supra note 1, at 320.
234. Id. at 335.
STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
nition must be established. A consensus on appropriate responses to
terrorist activities would assist attacked nations in countering a ter-
rorist crisis. At the present time, reactions to terrorism are ad hoc,
often isolating the reactionary state from international support.
Smaller coalitions would promote more cooperative measures to ar-
rest the problem. 3 5
The United Nations has been prevented from attempts to define
terrorism as criminal behavior due to vehement Third World resis-
tance. 36 The Soviet Union has abstained from voting against terror-
ism at the United Nations." Moreover, the Soviet Union obstructs
attempts to pass a comprehensive treaty addressing terrorism. 8 The
major impediment to a cooperative effort has not been the concept of
terrorism as abridging international law, but vagueness as to the im-
plementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the law once estab-
lished. 39 Specific exclusion of terrorist acts, undertaken on the
state's behalf, from the currently accepted political offense exception
would increase the likelihood that international terrorists would be
prosecuted and punished. 40
The International Law Association consolidated its Committee
on International Terrorism discussions to serve as a draft convention
precursor.241 Section 8 establishes that "[n]o State may afford sup-
port to a person or group engaged in or preparing to engage in acts
of international terrorism. 24' The explanatory note further clarifies
that state sponsorship of terrorism violates basic international law in
all instances.24 3 However, anti-terrorism instruments are ineffective
because many signatories ignore the legal obligations and boundaries
established by international conventions. 4
VI. Conclusion
The 1984 murder of British Police Constable Yvonne Fletcher
highlights the extensive abuses of diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties by state-supported terrorists. The United Kingdom's protection
235. Id. at 321.
236. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 27.
237. Y. ALEXANDER. ON TERRORISM AND COMBATING TERRORISM i I I (A. Merari ed.
1985).
238. Id.
239. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 28-
29.
240. International Terrorism, supra note I, at 358.
241. The International Law Association Paris Conference, held in 1984, convened to
formulate general definitions and to establish guidelines on the numerous aspects of interna-
tional terrorism. Id. at 383 (International Law Association Paris Conference, Committee on
International Terrorism Report).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 388.
244. Senate Subcommittee Report on State-Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 2, at 8.
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of the Libyan terrorists under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations contravenes the fundamental purposes of the Convention.
Terrorists, masquerading as diplomats, should not be afforded immu-
nity under a Convention that the state sponsoring the terrorists has
systematically schemed to abuse. A state should not be permitted the
freedom to use the diplomatic structure to promote illegal activity.
The Vienna Convention is the embodiment of customary inter-
national law on diplomatic relations and is designed to tailor the ac-
tivities of representatives exchanged between nations. The Conven-
tion does not need to be amended to address the problem of state-
sponsored terrorism since nonsignatory nations are equally bound as
signatories because the Convention outlines customary international
law. The Convention lacks a mechanism to effectively address the
situation of state-sponsored terrorists functioning under diplomatic
immunity. Therefore, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions should not become the legal standard binding nations subjected
to terrorists operating within the diplomatic structure.
A nation threatened by terrorism must use other means to re-
dress terroristic behavior by persons conferred diplomatic status by
the sponsoring state. The recent United Kingdom response to the
Syrian Embassy involvement with a terrorist ,4  more appropriately
addresses diplomatic abuses by nations sponsoring terrorism. The
prison sentence2 46 given to the terrorist and the British government's
curtailment of diplomatic relations with Syria places the responsibil-
ity and punishment for those responsible directly upon the source of
the terrorism, the -state promoting the terrorism by use of the diplo-
matic structure.
Jane Chace Sweeney
245. The Jordanian terrorist, Nezar Hindawi, attempted to blow up an El Al jet bound
for Tel Aviv by using his pregnant fiancee, Anne Murphy, as a human bomb. Hindawi had
placed a bag with plastic explosives in the suitcase of his Irish fiancee. When the bomb plot
was discovered by security agents as Anne Murphy boarded the plane, Hindawi fled to the
Syrian embassy. Serrill, Making the Syrian Connection, TIME, Nov. 3, 1986, at 39.
246. Nezar Hindawi was convicted by a criminal court jury and sentenced to forty-five

















DECEMBER Passports used by Abu Nidal
terrorists in attack on El Al counter
provided by Libya.
Hijacking of Egyptain airliner by
Abu Nidal supporters may have
involved Libyan support.
Four-man team of Libyan agents
arrested shortly before attempting
to attack gathering of Libyan exiles.
Former Libyan Prime Minister
Bakoush was the main target.
Libyan merchant wounded in
Athens by two gunmen; the victim
had left Libya 5 years earlier.
Libyan diplomat smuggles about
100 letter bombs addressed to
journalists into Tunisia. Several
explode, injuring two postal workers
and causing Tunisia to sever
diplomatic relations.
A Libyan diplomat at the United
Nations was declared persona non
grata, and 16 non-official Libyans
were subpoenaed to appear before a
U.S. grand jury in connection with
a plot to kill dissidents in several
different states.
Moroccan citizen, a resident in the
F.R.G. since 1960, killed by a








Anti-Qaddafi Libyan student killed
in Bonn by Libyan gunman who
was arrested. The assassin also
wounded two German passersby,
one seriously. The victim had been
a target of the Libyan regime for at
least 2 years.
Libyan businessman assassinated in
downtown Nicosia by an
unidentified gunman. The victim
was the director of an offshore
holding company and was believed
to be an opponent of the Libyan
regime.
Libyan jeweler murdered in his
shop in Rome. A silencer equipped
pistol was left at the scene by the
assassin.
Former Libyan Ambassador to
Austria severely wounded by two
shots fired from a car outside his
home in Vienna. The victim had
supported Qaddafi's seizure of
power in 1969, but he quit his post






President Mubarak announces that
four assassins sent to Egypt by
Libya to kill former Libyan Prime
Minister Bakoush had been arrested
and forced to send fake pictures to
the Libyan Embassy in Malta
showing Bakoush apparently dead.
Official Libyan press sources then
claimed Bakoush had been executed
by suicide squads sent abroad "to
liquidate enemies of the revolution."
A Libyan exile was found gagged
and strangled in a hotel in Rome.
The victim had been the subject of













Chadians discover plot to
assassinate President Habre with an
attache case bomb. Evidence of the
plot, including photographs of the
bomb, was provided to the United
Nations the following February
when Chad lodged a complaint
against Libya.
One of six Libyans awaiting trial
for bomb attacks in London in
March 1983 found shot to death in
a London apartment. The victim
may have been silenced by the
Libyan Government.
A bomb wrecks a car parked in
front of the Zairian Embassy in
Brussels.
A bomb exploded in the Brussels
office of Air Zaier.
Libya mined the Red Sea,
damaging 18 merchant ships of
varying nationalities.
Two Libyan students found
murdered in their apartment in a
crime reminiscent of Libyan killings
of anti-Qaddafi students in 1980
and 1981. The two were beaten,
strangled, and gagged before being
shot twice in the back.
Anti-Qaddafi Libyan editor of an
Arab newspaper in Athens killed by
two men on a motorbike.
Jana, the official Libyan news
agency, announces "the Libyan
masses have decided to form suicide
commandos to chase traitors and
stray dogs wherever they are and
liquidate them physically."
A bomb hidden in an unclaimed
suitcase probably unloaded from a
Libyan airliner explodes at London's















A number of British subjects in
Libya arrested on trumped-up
charges as hostages in order to
pressure British Government during
siege of Libyan People's Bureau in
London.
British policewoman killed and 11
anti-Qaddafi demonstrators wounded
by gunfire from London Libyan
People's Bureau. After a siege,
British authorities found weapons
and spent shell casings in the
vacated embassy.
Four bombs explode in London and
Manchester near homes of Libyan
exiles or at businesses frequented by
them. Over 25 people injured. Three
other bombs defused. Nine Libyan
suspects arrested.
One Libyan TU-22 bomber drops
bombs on Omdurman, Sudan, site
of a radio transmitter used by anti-
Qadhafi oppositionists.
Following annual Libyan General
People's Congress, the Libyan
Revolutionary Committees announce
that all Libyan exiles must return
to Libya or face "the death
penalty."
Chadian dissidents ready to
negotiate with Government of Chad





Libya gave material support to coup
in Burkina.
Libya invaded Chad for the second
time. Occupation continues into
1985.
Eight Libyan students in West
Germany, all members of an anti-
Qaddafi group, complain Libyan










Libyan General People's Congress
warns all Libyans in exile to return















Several bombs explode near
government installations in
Khartoum.
Planned assassination of visiting
Chadian official, Hissein Habre,
failed when those sent to conduct
the operation surrendered.
Two bombs explode in luggage
being unloaded from a plane
coming from Libya via Malta.
Two Libyan SU-22s that fired at
U.S. Navy F-14s over Gulf of Sidra
shot down.
Anti-Qaddafi Libyan student killed
in Ogden, Utah.
Bomb explodes in front of Chadian
embassy in Khartoum.
Libyan gunmen open fire on
passengers arriving at Rome's
airport on a flight from Algiers.






brutally murdered in London.
Two children of an anti-Qaddafi
Libyan poisoned by eating peanuts
containing thalium.
Libyan force occupied Chad.
Qaddafi attempted to force a
Libyan-Chadian union.
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Libyan subversion in The Gambia
caused break in relations.
Senegalese troops intervene under a
mutual defense treaty.
Anti-Qaddafi exile wounded in
Rome.
Libyan exile killed in Milan within
hours after expiration of a deadline
set by Qaddafi for all Libyan exiles
to return home.
Libyan exile shot at in Rome. The
arrested Libyan gunman says he
was sent by Libya "to kill an
enemy of the people."
Libyan exile killed in Athens. His
throat was slit.
Libyan businessman found strangled
to death in Rome.
Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.
Libyan exile killed in Rome by two
gunshots to the head.
Libyan lawyer shot and killed in
London.
Well-known Libyan businessman
killed. The arrested assassin said
the victim was an enemy of Col.
Qaddafi.
Two gunmen kill an anti-Qaddafi
Libyan journalist.
Tunisian and French Embassies in
Tripoli sacked and burned by a mob
while Libyan authorities took no
action.
An estimated 2,000 Libyans set fire
to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. The
Libyan authorities did not respond




NOVEMBER West Germany Two Libyans arrested with three
suspected Palestinians for an
unspecified terrorist operation.
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